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Laptop security: doesn't
anyone read the papers?
by Scott Bradner
Over the last few months there has been an unremitting
drumbeat of news stories about vast amounts of data being lost when corporate
laptops get stolen. In almost all
of these cases the data on the laptop was not encrypted but that is not the
real problem.
Google gets 8.2 million hits for laptop + stolen and Google
News gets 1,700. Some of these
hits point to software or devices to protect laptops against theft or to track
them when they get stolen but all too many are about laptops getting stolen and
far too often those laptops have what should be confidential information on
thousands of people.
The latest example comes from Ernst
& Young (E&Y) who managed to stuff a laptop with information about more
than 240,000 Hotels.com users, fail to encrypt it, then arrange things so that
the laptop could be stolen.
Apparently this happened a while back but E&Y did not have the
honesty to publicly admit their stupidity until The Register
(http://www.theregister.co.uk) started nosing around. This is not the only laptop that E&Y as let slip through
its fingers this year. Earlier
this year 4 E&Y laptops were stolen from a conference room while the
E&Y auditors that were supposed to protect them were off at lunch.
(http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/02/26/ey_laptops/) That happened shortly
after another E&Y employee managed to lose his laptop containing the Social
Security numbers of employees of some E&Y customers, including Sun
Microsystems. E&Y refuse to
say how many people were threatened by that loss.
Ernst & Young is hardly alone
in its zeal to expose other's confidential information then not fess up. There is the marvy case of the VA
employee who had been taking home disks full of SSNs and other information on
veterans (26 million as it turned out) for years -- it took the VA weeks to
break the news when the data finally got stolen. Other recent examples include a Fidelity laptop with SSNs
and other data for about 200,000 HP employees and a Wells Fargo laptop with
info on "a relatively small percentage" of Wells Fargo's millions of
customers (apparently Wells Fargo, like Ernst & Young, thinks that
providing incomplete information is not the same thing as lying).
These cases are stupid. Doesn't anyone at these companies read
the stories in the papers about the problem of stolen laptops? The problem is actually best described
by E&Y on their web page on information security "However, organizations are missing the rare investment
opportunities that compliance offers to promote information security as an
integral part of their business." "(http://www.ey.com/global/content.nsf/International/Press_Release_-_2005_Global_Information_Security_Survey)
Ernst & Young seems to have been a perfect example of what it was talking
about.
The problem is not that these
laptops were not using encryption (the press is reporting that all E&Y
laptops are now, belatedly, using encryption) -- the real problem is having the
SSNs and credit card numbers on the laptops in the first place. I see no possible reason for an auditor
like Ernst & Young to ever have SSNs or credit card numbers on a
laptop. In any reasonable society
this would be illegal, but donŐt hold your breath for that to happen in the
U.S. Note that good security practice is to assume that any laptop will be (not
"may be") stolen. A
cryptographic hash of the SSN or card number can be used if a unique identifier
is needed.
Until people begin to understand
that employees should only have the confidential data they actually need at any
particular time, rather than, by default, having all the data the company has, we
will keep seeing these headlines about more people acting with abject
stupidity.
disclaimer: Harvard, as far as I
know, does not teach abject stupidity, so the above rant is mine not the
university's.